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Abstract 
This paper asks two questions. 1) Do multinational enterprises (MNEs) present different 
patterns of employment from domestic firms? 2) Do workers in MNEs face a higher 
risk of losing jobs? We distinguish two types of MNEs (i.e., Japanese MNEs and 
foreign-owned firms) and utilize firm-level data in Japan between 1995 and 2000. It was 
true that the net job destruction of Japanese MNEs was larger than those of foreign-
owned firms and domestic firms. However, this negative employment growth is 
attributable not to rapid job destruction but to slow job creation. Second, workers in 
Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms did not face a higher risk of losing jobs than 
did those in domestic firms. This finding contradicts the findings of Barba Navaretti, 
Turrini, and Checchi (2003) but is consistent with the firm-specific skill hypothesis of 
Fukao and Otaki (1993). Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms might invest heavily 
in job training, which results in their lower employment volatility. 
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1.  Introduction 
With the rapid expansion of the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs), 
the importance of employment of MNEs is well recognized. There are two major 
concerns. One is the effect of offshore production on domestic employment, which has 
often been argued to be negative. This is because offshore production by an MNE 
replaces domestic production, which shifts its downward-sloping labor demand 
schedule and so employment offered by the MNE declines in the home country. 
Theoretically, however, the effects of offshore production on domestic 
employment can be both positive and negative. As Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, 
pp. 43–44) suggest, domestic employment declines through horizontal foreign direct 
investment (FDI) but expands through vertical FDI. Therefore, if a firm conducts both 
horizontal and vertical FDI at the same time, the effects on employment become 
ambiguous. The same is true at the aggregate level. Net effects are unclear if some firms 
conduct vertical FDI while others conduct horizontal FDI. The final economy-wide 
outcome is an empirical matter. 
The other concern is job uncertainty, or employment volatility. It is often argued 
that MNEs are more likely to have a higher degree of employment volatility than 
domestic firms.
1  However, if MNEs incur higher training costs for workers to 
accumulate firm-specific skill than domestic firms, exogenous shocks will be absorbed 
by the adjustment of working hours and real wages rather than the employment level 
(Fukao and Otaki, 1993). This in turn implies that MNEs would not like to adjust 
employment rapidly. Again, we need empirical studies to examine the validity of these 
two different theoretical predictions. 
Note that there are two types of MNEs in a country. One is an MNE that has an 
affiliate in a foreign country and the other is a foreign-owned firm that has a parent firm 
in its home country. These two types of firms do not always have the same effects on 
employment. For instance, the entry of foreign-owned firms is mainly through merger 
and acquisition (M&A), which is a typical mode of entry to developed countries.
2 Thus, 
the job creation of foreign-owned firms does not necessarily mean the creation of “new 
jobs” but it simply means that jobs are reallocated from domestic to foreign-owned 
firms through ownership status change. Besides, it is sometimes believed that foreign-
owned firms more rapidly destroy jobs than domestic firms and therefore the 
                                                        
1 Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) give two reasons why the employment of MNEs could be 
more volatile than that of domestic firms. First, the degree of exposure to international shocks is 
higher for MNEs than for domestic firms. Second, since MNEs generally operate many more plants 
than domestic firms, MNEs have lower costs of relocation of production activities than domestic 
firms. 
2 For more detail, see UNCTAD (2004, pp. 111–114). 
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employment offered by foreign-owned firms entails higher uncertainty.
 3
This paper empirically addresses these concerns by asking the following 
questions. First, do MNEs destroy jobs at home and create jobs abroad? Second, do 
workers in MNEs face a higher risk of losing their jobs? In order to answer these 
questions, we use large-scale firm-level panel data in Japan for 1995–2002. Our data 
consist of firms in manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade industries and the number 
of firms exceeds 16,000 annually. 
This paper brings together and contributes to three literatures. The first literature 
includes the paper by Brainard and Riker (1997) who examined the effects of offshore 
production by U.S. MNEs on the U.S. parent employment. Our new contribution is that 
we examine the employment patterns of the Japanese MNEs that have production sites 
in foreign countries, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms at the same time and 
clarify how the employment patterns of MNEs are different from domestic firms. 
The second literature investigated the employment volatility of MNEs. Two 
different hypotheses exist. One predicts that employment volatility is higher for MNEs 
than for domestic firms and is found in Barba Navaretti, Turrini, and Checchi (2003). 
Using firm-level data in 11 European countries, they found that employment adjustment 
was significantly faster in foreign-owned firms than in domestic firms. The other 
predicts that employment volatility is lower for MNEs than for domestic firms because 
of firm-specific skill accumulation, as suggested by Fukao and Otaki (1993). We 
address this issue in Japan, thus contributing to the literature by adding another national 
perspective to available evidence. 
The third literature is job creation and destruction in Japan and is found in 
Genda (1998) and Higuchi (2001). Our new contribution is the latest update of these 
studies and covers the period after 1998. In Japan, job destruction by MNEs is a great 
concern for policy makers with the expansion of Japanese MNEs’ activities in the 1990s. 
Figure 1 presents the unemployment rate from 1955 to 2005. It clearly indicates that the 
unemployment rate was historically low until 1995. Except in 1987, the unemployment 
rate is less than 3.0 percent from 1955 to 1994. However, after the bubble-burst period, 
the unemployment rate steadily rose and exceeded 3.0 percent in 1995. Japan faced a 
severe financial crisis in 1997. Accordingly, the unemployment rate rapidly increased 
from 3.5 percent in January 1998 to 4.1 percent in July 1998. It continued to rise and 
exceeded 5.0 percent in July 2001. In June 2002, the unemployment rate reached 5.5 
percent, which is the highest rate in the past 50 years. 
=== Figure 1 === 
                                                        
3 “Strictly businesslike. That’s the way Japanese view foreign-affiliated firms when it comes to 
corporate restructuring,” The Japan Times Online, February 9
th, 2002. (Article by Tetsushi Kajimoto, 
“Foreign firms draw both keen, reluctant Japanese.”) 
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Several factors raised the unemployment rate. Among them, offshore production 
by MNEs, especially the production in East Asia, is believed to be one of the most 
important factors.
4 Rapid economic growth of East Asian countries attracts Japanese 
FDI and, therefore, Japanese MNEs relocate production plants from Japan to East Asian 
countries such as China. Accordingly, this causes “hollowing out” of industries, which 
results in the decline of employment in Japan. Note that the concern about “hollowing 
out” of industries is not limited to Japan, and is often discussed in several developed 
countries.
5 Indeed, the employment response to the expansion of MNEs’ activities is 
commonly an important issue in developed countries. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section discusses the data 
used for the analysis and provides an overview of the employment patterns for Japanese 
MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms. Section 3 asks whether MNEs destroy 
jobs in home and host countries and examines the job creation and destruction patterns 
of Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms. Section 4 estimates the speed of 
employment adjustment in order to answer whether workers in MNEs face a higher risk 
of losing jobs. Section 5 summarizes the major findings and discusses policy 
implications. 
 
2.  The Data 
2.1. Source 
We use the micro database of Kigyou Katsudou Kihon Chousa Houkokusho (The 
Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities) prepared 
annually by the Research and Statistics Department, METI (1994–2002) (hereafter, 
referred to as the METI database). This survey was first conducted in 1991, then in 
1994, and annually afterwards. The main purpose of the survey is to capture statistically 
the overall picture of Japanese corporate firms in light of their activity diversification, 
globalization, and strategies on research and development and information technology. 
The strength of the survey is its sample coverage and reliability of information. The 
survey includes all firms with more than 50 employees and with capital of more than 30 
million yen. 
The survey covers mining, manufacturing, and service industries, although some 
services industries, such as finance, insurance, and software services, are not included. 
Our study thus can address the issues of outward FDI by manufacturing firms and the 
inward FDI by foreign firms in wholesale/retail trade, which are commonly observed 
FDI patterns in developed countries. The limitation of the survey is that some 
                                                        
4 Fukao and Amano (2004, pp. 80–87) provide a survey on this issue. Cowling and Tomlinson (2000) 
also discuss the negative effects of offshore production by Japanese MNEs on domestic employment 
in the 1990s. 
5 See, for instance, Feinberg and Keane (2001) for the case of Canada, and Barry (2004) for the case 
of Ireland. 
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information on financial and institutional features, such as keiretsu, are not available 
and small firms with less than 50 workers (or with capital of less than 30 million yen) 
are excluded. 
From these surveys, we constructed a longitudinal (panel) data set for the years 
from 1995 to 2002. We removed firms from our sample if firm age (questionnaire-level 
year minus establishment year), total wages, tangible assets, value-added (sales minus 
purchases), or employment were not positive and responses were incomplete.
6 We focus 
on manufacturing and wholesale and retail industries since the number of firms in other 
industries is rather small. The number of firms exceeds 16,000 annually. 
In our study, we classify multinational firms into two categories. One is the 
foreign-owned firm, which is defined as a firm with more than 33.3 percent of the 
equity coming from foreign investors. The other is the Japanese MNE, which is defined 
as a firm with at least one production affiliate in foreign country.
7 All other Japanese 
firms are classified as domestic firms. 
 
2.2. Employment Growth 
Table 1 presents the employment growth of all firms, Japanese MNEs, foreign-
owned firms, and domestic firms from 1995 to 2002. The employment growth of all 
firms indicates similar patterns to the unemployment rate in Figure 1. The negative 
employment growth is much larger for 1995–1998 than for 1998–2002. The result 
suggests that the recession became severe after 1998. Note also that the net employment 
growth rate is different between firm types. Although Japanese MNEs and domestic 
firms indicate negative growth, foreign-owned firms generally present positive growth 
throughout the period except for 1995–1996 and 1999–2000. 
=== Table 1 === 
Table 2 indicates employment growth by industry.
8 There are three messages in 
this table. First, although overall annual average employment growth is negative (–1.3 
percent from 1995 to 2002), there are some differences between manufacturing and 
wholesale/retail trade. While the manufacturing sector shows negative employment 
growth (–3.1 percent for 1995–2002), the wholesale/retail trade indicates positive 
growth (1.3 percent for 1995–2002). Positive employment growth is supported by the 
growth of retail trade, indicating 3.6 percent of the annual average growth rate for 
1995–2002. Second, although manufacturing as a whole indicates negative growth, 
                                                        
6 In the METI database, the employment is defined as the number of regular workers that include 
part-time workers but exclude day workers. 
7 If a firm with more than 33.3 percent equity coming from foreign investors has one production 
affiliate in foreign countries, we classify such firm into foreign-owned firms. 
8 For the sectoral distribution of the number of MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms, see 
Table A1. The industry code is assigned to each firm in 1994 or the time of entry. 
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employment growth rates differ between industries. For instance, non-metallic mineral 
products rapidly decline, indicating an annual average growth rate of –5.0 percent for 
1995–2002. On the other hand, precision machinery declines slowly, presenting a –0.9 
percent average annual growth rate. These results imply that industry could be one 
factor explaining the difference in employment growth between firms. 
=== Table 2 === 
Finally, and most importantly, the employment change is quite different across 
firm types. While MNEs and domestic firms indicate negative employment growth in 
almost all industries, foreign-owned firms present positive employment growth in many 
industries. The remarkable employment growth of foreign-owned firms is confirmed in 
transportation machinery and retail trade, presenting 20.2 and 21.0 percent annual 
average growth rates, respectively. 
 
3.  Gross and Net Job Flows of MNEs 
3.1. Job Creation and Job Destruction 
3.1.1. Methodology 
This section investigates how patterns of job creation and destruction compare 
between Japanese MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms. The analysis of job 
creation and destruction is particularly useful for examining gross job flows. Net job 
flows, which are defined as job creation plus destruction, mask several facts. For 
instance, if “hollowing out” by Japanese MNEs is proceeding, the difference between 
Japanese MNEs and domestic firms must be apparent mainly in job destruction: 
Japanese MNEs must have a higher job destruction rate than domestic firms. In addition, 
when the net job growth is negative, the job destruction effects cancel out job creation 
effects. Thus, we may underestimate the contribution of MNEs to job creation without 
examining job creation and destruction at the same time. 
Several studies, such as Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) and Davis, 
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), have confirmed that gross job flows, which are defined 
as job creation plus destruction, are substantially larger than net job flows, which are 
defined as job creation minus destruction. Levinsohn (1999) extended this analytical 
framework to examine the relationship between international trade orientation and gross 
job flows. Levinsohn (1999) found that, in Chile, trade liberalization promoted job 
reallocation in the job market. Following Levinsohn (1999), we adopt the analytical 
framework of Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and apply the framework to 
examine job creation and job destruction by multinationals. 
Denote   as the employment of firm i of firm type 
s
it L S s∈  in year  . Firm type 
is classified into three groups: Japanese MNEs JM , foreign-owned firms FF , and 
t
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domestic firms DF . Denote the symbol Δ  as the first-difference operator from year 
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Table 3 presents the job creation and destruction rates of Japanese firms from 
1995 to 2002. The net job flows, which are defined as job creation rates plus job 
destruction rates, are the same as the net employment growth rates presented in Table 2: 
the net job flows of Japanese MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms are –3.7 
percent, 9.4 percent, and –0.5 percent, respectively. In Table 3, however, we can identify 
job creation and destruction through status change. 
=== Table 3 === 
Three findings stand out from this table. First, job creation rates vary widely 
among firm types. In particular, the job creation rate of Japanese MNEs is small 
whereas that of foreign-owned firms is large. The job creation rates of Japanese MNEs, 
foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms are 2.3 percent, 14.9 percent, and 5.4 percent, 
respectively. 
Note that the largest parts of the job creation rates of Japanese MNEs and 
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foreign-owned firms are attributable to status change. If we focus on newly created jobs 
(i.e., job creation rate excluding status change), job creation rates by Japanese MNEs, 
foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms are 0.8 percent, 2.9 percent, and 4.8 percent, 
respectively. This implies that MNEs create jobs in host countries and the job creation 
through M&A is a source of job creation by foreign-owned firms in Japan. In this paper, 
we focus on the newly created/destroyed jobs; hereafter job creation and destruction 
excludes those occurring through status change, unless otherwise noted. 
Second, the job destruction rate of domestic firms is much larger than that of 
Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms. The job destruction rates of Japanese MNEs, 
foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms for 1995–2002 are –4.0 percent, –2.8 percent, 
and –4.9 percent, respectively. This result means that MNEs destroy jobs in their home 
country but the degree of destruction is smaller than that of domestic firms. 
Third, Japanese MNEs present the smallest contribution to the net job creation 
rate. While the net job creation rate is 0.0 percent for domestic firms and 0.2 percent for 
foreign-owned firms, it is –3.2 percent for Japanese MNEs.
9 Note that Japanese MNEs 
present a smaller job destruction rate than do domestic firms. Negative employment 
growth of Japanese MNEs is therefore attributable to slow job creation rather than to 
rapid job destruction, implying that the job destruction by Japanese MNEs is not severe 
compared with domestic firms. 
 
Alternative threshold level 
There may be a concern about the specified threshold level of foreign equity 
ownership. In the baseline analysis, a foreign-owned firm is defined as a firm where 
more than 33.3 percent of the equity is from foreign investors. However, there are 
several Japanese firms that have a large part of the equity owned by foreign investors. 
For instance, the equity share of foreign investors is 48.1 percent for Sony, 48.7 percent 
for Fujifilm, and 37.9 percent for Nintendo.
10 To check the sensitivity of the threshold 
level, we redefine a foreign-owned firm as a firm where more than 50.0 percent of the 
equity is from foreign investors (majority-owned firms). 
The right hand side of Table 3 indicates the results when we redefine the foreign-
owned firms. The results are generally the same as the results when we define a foreign-
owned firm as the firm with more than 33.3 percent of foreign ownership except the 
                                                        
9 Note that foreign-owned firms present a positive net job creation rate (0.2 percent) for 1995–2002, 
although they present negative net job creation (i.e., job destruction) rates in two subperiods: for 
1995–1998 (–1.3 percent) and for 1998–2002 (–1.0 percent). This is caused by status change. For 
instance, suppose that a domestic firm changes its status to a foreign-owned firm between 1995 and 
1998 and destroys jobs between 1998 and 2002. This change is regarded as job destruction by 
foreign-owned incumbent firms for 1998–2002. However, the change is classified into status change 
for 1995–2002. Thus, the results for the overall period are not always the same as those for 
subperiods. 
10 Nikkei Newspaper, June 28, 2005. (In Japanese.) 
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status change of foreign-owned firms. The effects of status change decline when we 
redefine foreign-owned firms. This implies that status changes are mainly occurred 
between 33.3 and 50.0 percents of equity share and thus our results are not very 
sensitive to the threshold level once we exclude the effects of status change. 
 
Difference between manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
Table 2 confirms that there are clear differences in net job growth between 
manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade. To investigate the differences in more detail, 
we calculate job creation and destruction rates for manufacturing and wholesale/retail 
trade, respectively. 
=== Table 4 === 
Table 4 presents the results of job creation and destruction rates in 
manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade for 1995–2002. Two messages are evident in 
this table. First, the positive net job flows in wholesale/retail trade for all firms are 
attributable to the large job creation rate in wholesale/retail trade. Table 4 indicates that 
job creation rates in manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade are 1.8 percent and 5.8 
percent, respectively. On the other hand, the differences in job destruction rates are 
relatively small, indicating –4.9 percent in manufacturing and –4.5 percent in 
wholesale/retail trade. The results imply that the positive employment growth rate in 
wholesale/retail trade is supported by the strong job creation rate. 
Second, there are notable differences between firm types in job creation and 
destruction rates. In all firm types, job creation rates in manufacturing are much smaller 
than those in wholesale/retail trade. For Japanese MNEs, the job creation rate in 
manufacturing is 0.6 percent, whereas it is 1.8 percent in wholesale/retail trade. The job 
creation rate of foreign-owned firms in manufacturing is 1.8 percent, which is much 
smaller than the 7.0 percent in wholesale/retail trade. Similarly, the job creation rate of 
domestic firms in wholesale/retail trade is 6.2 percent, which is more than twice the job 
creation rate of domestic firms in manufacturing. 
Job destruction rates are much larger in terms of absolute values in 
wholesale/retail trade than in manufacturing for foreign-owned firms and vice versa for 
Japanese MNEs and domestic firms. The job destruction rate of Japanese MNEs is –4.0 
percent in manufacturing and –3.7 percent in nonmanufacturing. Similarly, the job 
destruction rate of domestic firms is –5.4 percent, which is –0.9 percent larger than the 
job destruction rate in wholesale/retail trade. On the other hand, the job destruction rate 
of foreign-owned firms is –2.1 percent in manufacturing and –5.2 percent in 
wholesale/retail trade. Job destruction in manufacturing, therefore, is much more severe 
in Japanese firms (Japanese MNEs and domestic firms) than in foreign-owned firms. 
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3.1.3. Discussion 
  This subsection provides more detailed examination on the job creation and 
destruction, focusing on some specific aspects. Because of the page limits, we 




One may concern that the difference of job creation and destruction patterns 
might be attributable to the firm size rather than the status of firms. To examine the 
difference of firm size, we examine the job creation and destruction rates for large, 
medium-sized, and small-sized firms, respectively. The large firm is defined as a firm 
with more than 1,000 workers. The small-sized firm is a firm with less than 300 workers. 
Other firms are defined as medium-sized firms.
11
Table A3 indicates that firm size as well as multinational status might be an 
important factor to explain the difference of employment patterns between Japanese 
MNEs and domestic firms. There is a notable difference of job destruction rates in large 
firms between Japanese MNEs and domestic firms. On the other hand, the job 
destruction rate of Japanese MNEs indicates almost the same as that of domestic firms 
for medium- and small-sized firms. The results imply that the arguments of “hollowing 
out” of Japanese industries might be based on the difference of the employment patterns 
between large Japanese MNEs and large domestic firms. 
 
Period and industry 
It is often pointed out that the employment patterns might be largely affected by 
periods and industries. We thus examine the job creation and destruction rates by period 
and by industry. The results are presented in Tables A4 and A5. The main conclusions 
are summarized as follows. First, the severe recession might have strong effects on the 
employment of firms. Job destruction rates for 1998–2002 are much larger than those 
for 1995–1998 regardless of the firm types. 
Second, multinational status is an important factor in explaining the employment 
patterns of firms in Japan, even after controlling for industry-specific factor. The results 
indicate that the job creation and destruction rates slightly different across sectors even 
in the same status. However, even after we examined the same industry, the 
multinational status can explain some of the difference of employment across firms. For 
instance, in electrical machinery, the job destruction rate of domestic firms is –6.5 
percent that is significantly larger than that of Japanese MNEs (–4.6 percent). 
 
                                                        
11 Table A2 summarizes the number of Japanese MNEs, foreign-owned firms, domestic firms, by 
firm size. 
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Effects on production workers 
An important policy question is whether MNEs destroy production workers’ jobs 
more rapidly than nonproduction workers’ jobs. The job destruction by MNEs in the 
manufacturing sector affects production workers more than the rest of the labor force. 
This is because the shift of production sites from Japan to foreign countries may cause a 
stronger decline in demand for production workers than for other workers. The analyses 
above cannot answer this question, although this question is a great concern for policy 
makers. We thus further decompose job creation and destruction in manufacturing firms 
into production and nonproduction workers, and examine the differences between firm 
types. 
Table A6 indicates the results. We found that the net job destruction in 
production workers was confirmed in all types of firms, with Japanese MNEs presenting 
higher net job destruction rate than domestic firms. However, the gross job destruction 
rate for MNEs’ production workers is much smaller than that for domestic firms. These 
results suggest that the higher job destruction rate by Japanese MNEs is because MNEs 
do not create many jobs for production workers. 
 
3.2. Net Job Growth of MNEs 
3.2.1. Methodology 
Previous section examined job creation and destruction rates by firm types. 
However, employment change may possibly depend on various industry and firm 
characteristics in addition to firm types. We thus examine the net employment growth 
controlling for various firm characteristics at the same time, based on the following 
regression analysis:  




it it it it Z D D L L g μ η λ γ β α + + + + + = Δ = − − −                                                    (2) 
where   and   are MNE and foreign-owned firm dummies that take value one if 
firm   is a MNE and foreign-owned firm in year 
JM
it D 1 −
JF
it D 1 −
i 1 − t  respectively,   is a vector of 
control variables such as (observable) firm characteristics, 
1 − it Z
i η  is an unobservable firm 
specific effect, and  it μ  is an error term. The coefficient β   thus captures the gap of 
employment growth rates between MNEs and domestic firms after controlling for 
various firm characteristics. Similarly, the coefficient γ   represents the gap between 
foreign-owned firms and domestic firms. If MNEs and foreign-owned firms show much 
faster job destruction rate than domestic firms, the coefficients β  and  γ  indicate 
significantly negative signs. 
There are two strategies to estimate equation (2): fixed-effect and random-effect 
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models. In estimating (2), however, a fixed-effect model has a problem. The fixed-effect 
model identifies the effects of MNE (foreign-owned firm) status only when there are 
changes in the status during the period. In other words, a firm that is an MNE (or a 
foreign-owned firm) throughout the period does not have any effects on the estimated 
coefficient β  (γ ). To take into account the effects of a firm that has the same status 
throughout the period, we employ random-effect model. 
In the previous section, we confirmed that firm size, period, and industry might 
be important factors in explaining the employment patter of firms. We use the natural 
log of firm size (the number of workers), year dummies, and industry dummies as 
control variables  . In addition to firm size, we include additional firm 
characteristics, capital intensity (capital-labor ratio), firm age, research and development 
(R&D) intensity (R&D-sales ratio), and average wages, in order to control for the 
various observable firm characteristics. Firms that switch their multinational status are 
excluded from the samples so that we can remove the effects of status change. 
1 − it Z
 
3.2.2. Results 
Table 5 presents the regression results of equation (2) with random-effect model. 
Two findings stand out from this table. First, Japanese MNEs tend to present much 
faster net job growth rate in manufacturing while much faster negative growth rate in 
wholesale and retail trade. The coefficients of Japanese MNE dummy indicate positive 
and significant signs in manufacturing and negative and significant signs in wholesale 
and retail trade. Once we controlled for the firm-, period-, and industry-characteristics, 
Japanese manufacturing MNEs contribute to the employment growth of firms between 
1995 and 2002. 
=== Table 5 === 
Second, the net employment growth of foreign-owned firms is almost the same 
as that of domestic firms. Most of the coefficients do not indicate statistically significant 
signs once we controlled for the various firm characteristics. The results imply that the 
severe restructuring by foreign-owned firms is not necessarily true once we controlled 
for the various firm characteristics. These findings are robust even when we redefine a 
foreign-owned firms the firm with more than 50.0 percent of foreign equity share. 
 
4.  Employment Volatility of MNEs 
4.1. Baseline Model 
This section examines the difference in employment volatility between Japanese 
MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms. To examine the differences, following 
Barba Navaretti, Turrini, and Checchi (2003), we estimate a dynamic labor demand 
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function.
12 The analytical framework is summarized as follows. Suppose that firm i 
produces output   in year   using labor   and capital   based on a Cobb–Douglas 
production function with the constant returns to scale technology. Denote the prices of 
labor and capital as   and  , respectively. Assume that effective employment of 
firm   in year     is not necessarily the same as desired employment  . Assume that 
the adjustment process is described as  , where 





i t it L
*
it L
λ ) / ( ) / ( 1
*
1 1 − − − = it it it it L L L L λ  indicates the 
speed of adjustment  ) 1 0 ( ≤ ≤ λ . Thus, in logarithmic form, the firm-level conditional 
labor demand is: 
, 1 2 1 0 it it it it it l p y Trend l ε γ β β β α + + + + + = −  (2) 
where Trend  is time trend to control for Hicks-neutral technological growth,  , 
,  , and 
it it L l ln =




it it p p p = it ε   is an error term. The speed of adjustment is 
obtained from the estimated equation:  γ λ − =1 . 
To examine the differences in the speeds of employment adjustment, we 
introduce dummy variables to a lagged dependent variable: 
,           1 1 1 2 2 2


























D l D l l D p D p p
D y D y y D D Trend l
ε γ γ γ β β β
β β β β β β α
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + + =
− − −
 (3) 
where   and    are dummy variables that take the value one if a firm is a 
Japanese MNE and a foreign-owned firm, respectively. The coefficients   and   
indicate significantly negative signs when Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms 








Note that a lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term (even if 
we assume that  it ε  is not itself autocorrelated). In order to overcome this problem while 
                                                        
12 A detailed description of the labor adjustment function is found in Hamermesh (1993). 
13 The speed of adjustment for Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms is obtained from 
 and  , respectively. 
JM JM γ γ λ − − =1
FF FF γ γ λ − − =1
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also taking into account the initial conditions problem, we resort to using the 
generalized method of moment (GMM) systems estimator (system-GMM) developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998). The system GMM estimator consists of the first differenced 
and level versions of the estimating equation. The lagged level values are used as 
instruments for the first differenced equation while the lagged differences are used as 
the instruments for level equation. The validity of these instruments can be tested using 
a Hansen test.
14
The major data source is the METI database. Labor   is defined as the number 
of workers. Output   is defined as the real value added. The average wage is obtained 
from total wages divided by the number of workers. The price of capital is computed 
following Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005). As employment growth equation, 
firms that switch their multinational status are excluded from the samples so that we can 





Table 6 presents the estimation results of the speed of employment adjustment in 
equation (3) generated by the system GMM.
15 We also run regressions with year 
dummies instead of time trends to control for the demand shocks in this period. The 
summary statistics of dependent and independent variables are presented in Table B1. 
The test results perform generally well in wholesale trade and retail trade. Although the 
Hansen test rejects the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid in 
manufacturing as a whole, the test does not reject the null hypothesis at the each sectoral 
level. While it is safe to reject the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation in 
the differenced residuals, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of no second-
order serial correlation in wholesale and retail trade.  
=== Table 6 === 
The major findings are summarized as follows. First, in manufacturing as a 
whole, there is a statistically significant difference in adjustment speed between MNEs 
and domestic firms. The speed-of-adjustment is the fastest in domestic firms, relatively 
fast in Japanese MNEs, and the slowest in foreign-owned firms. The coefficients of 
                                                        
14 System GMM yields consistent estimator under the assumption that there is no second order 
correlation of the residuals of the first-differenced equation. The standard procedure to verify this 
assumption is to use an AR(2) test on the residuals developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which 
we also implement for our estimates. For more detail about system GMM, see Baltagi (2001, 
pp.142-144). 
15 Other coefficients are reported in Table B2. 
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1 − × it
JM
it l D   indicate statistically significant positive signs, implying that the speed-of-
adjustment is slower for MNEs than for domestic firms. Besides, the speed-of-
adjustment of foreign-owned firms is slower than domestic firms and Japanese MNEs, 
as the coefficients of   are positively significant and much larger than those of 
. 
1 − × it
FF
it l D
1 − × it
JM
it l D
Second, the results of sectoral breakdowns indicate some but not large 
differences in the speed of adjustment. The speed-of-adjustment of domestic firms is 
much faster than those of Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms except chemicals. In 
chemicals, the coefficients of   are not significant although they are positive.  1 − × it
JM
it l D
There may be some concern about the specified threshold level of foreign equity 
ownership. In the baseline model, a foreign-owned firm is defined as a firm where more 
than 33.3 percent of the equity is from foreign investors. To check the sensitivity of the 
threshold level, we redefine a foreign-owned firm as a firm where more than 50.0 
percent of the equity is from foreign investors (majority-owned firms). Table B3 
presents the estimation results of the speed of employment adjustment and it indicates 
that the results are almost the same as those of Table 6. Thus, our results are not 
sensitive to the threshold level of foreign equity.  
These results suggest that the workers in MNEs and foreign-owned firms do not 
necessarily face a higher risk of losing jobs compared with those in domestic firms. 
Rather, our results support the prediction by Fukao and Otaki (1993). Employment 
volatility is lower for MNEs than for domestic firms because of firm-specific skill 
accumulation. This result is not the same as the result found in European firms (Barba 
Navaretti, Checci, and Turrini, 2003) and may indicate differences between European 
and Japanese MNEs in employment patterns.
16
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we ask two questions. 1) Do multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
present different patterns of employment from domestic firms? 2) Do workers in MNEs 
face a higher risk of losing jobs? We distinguish two types of MNEs (i.e., Japanese 
MNEs and foreign-owned firms) and utilize firm-level data in Japan between 1995 and 
2002. Our major findings are as follows. First, the net negative employment growth is 
observed only for Japanese MNEs. However, the negative growth is not attributable to 
                                                        
16 This result may represent the Japanese specific employment pattern as Ito (1992) pointed out 
“both blue-collar and white-collar workers in typical Japanese firms are trained more extensively 
than those in typical US firms” (p.214). 
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rapid job destruction. Rather, the problem is in slow job creation. Moreover, the 
negative employment growth of the MNEs is mostly explained by the firm-, period-, 
and industry-specific factors. Once we controlled for these factors, multinational status 
indicates the positive contribution to the employment growth in manufacturing. 
Second, it is sometimes believed that workers for MNEs and foreign-owned 
firms face a higher job uncertainty than workers for domestic firms but our results do 
not support this claim. Our results suggest that employment volatility is much larger for 
domestic firms than for MNEs and foreign-owned firms, implying that workers in 
Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms did not face a higher risk of losing jobs than 
did workers in domestic firms. Rather, domestic firms present faster employment 
adjustment in some industries. This finding contradicts the finding of Barba Navaretti, 
Turrini, and Checchi (2003) but is consistent with the firm-specific skill hypothesis of 
Fukao and Otaki (1993). Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms might invest heavily 
in job training, which results in lower employment volatility. 
Two implications for policy debate can be drawn from our analysis. First, the 
recent rise in the unemployment rate might not be attributable to offshore production by 
Japanese MNEs. It is true that the negative employment growth of Japanese MNEs is 
much faster than that of domestic firms. However, the job destruction rate of Japanese 
MNEs is smaller than that of domestic firms. The difference between Japanese MNEs 
and domestic firms is observed in the job creation rate, which is not explained by the 
relocation of plants by MNEs from Japan to other countries. Besides, once we control 
for the firm-, period-, and industry-specific factors, Japanese manufacturing MNEs 
present significantly faster growth than domestic firms. This in turn implies that there 
are factors other than “hollowing out” of industries that explain the rise in the 
unemployment rate after 1998. 
Second, the inward FDI promotion policy might have some validity. Foreign-
owned firms contributed to the creation of jobs in Japan between 1995 and 2002. The 
foreign-owned firms created jobs not by new entries but by their M&As. Although they 
were not newly created jobs, we can at least say that the foreign-owned firms helped by 
propping up employment in the 1990s. Similar arguments can be applied to other 
developed countries where FDI through M&A is becoming popular. Fukao and Amano 
(2004) pointed out that Japan still had entry barriers to foreign-owned firms in some 
industries such as medical services. The removal of such barriers thus might attract 
foreign investors.
17
Our paper presents various avenues for future research. One important direction 
is firm-level analysis of the relationship between labor demand and international trade. 
Various studies examined the effects of international trade on labor demand (e.g., 
Revenga, 1992, and Slaughter, 2001, for the United States; Levinsohn, 1999, for Chile; 
                                                        
17 See, Fukao and Amano (2004, pp.55-57). 
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Krishna, Mitra, and Chinoy, 2001, for Turkey; Tomiura, 2003, 2004, for Japan). 
However, little attention has been paid to firm-level study, and this is an interesting 
question yet to be addressed. 
Another important aspect is the difference in the destination of FDI. The study 
did not take account of the difference in destination markets but simply asked whether a 
firm has an affiliate in foreign countries. However, as Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz 
(2004) argued in their analysis of the differences in export destination by firms, 
different market penetration causes different firm behaviors, including labor demand. 
For instance, it is expected that Japanese MNEs that have an affiliate in China present a 
different labor demand pattern than the pattern from MNEs that have an affiliate in the 
United States. Such an analysis requires enormous efforts to construct a new database 
but it may reveal new regularities of MNEs’ behavior. 
It is also important to extend our analysis to examine foreign-owned firms in the 
services sectors in Japan. The coverage of data in this paper is limited to manufacturing, 
wholesale trade, and retail trade. However, the foreign-owned firms in Japan are notable 
in other service sectors such as finance. Since most of the previous related literatures 
focused on the manufacturing sector, the detailed examination on the activities of 
foreign-owned firms in services sector provides us useful information. These topics are 
included in our future research agenda. 
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Appendix. Job Creation and Job Destruction: Differences in Firm Size, Periods, 
and Industries 
A1. Difference by Firm Size 
Table A3 indicates the job creation and destruction rates, by firm size. Firms that 
changes their size are includes into entry and exit in this table such that the table does 
not become complex.
18 Therefore, we just focus on the results of incumbent. 
=== Table A3 === 
The results suggest that firm size as well as multinational status might be an 
important factor to explain the difference of employment patterns between Japanese 
MNEs and domestic firms. For instance, the difference of job destruction rate between 
Japanese MNEs and domestic firms is particularly notable in large firms. The job 
destruction rates of large Japanese MNEs and large domestic firms are –2.6 percent and 
–0.8 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the job destruction rates of medium-sized 
Japanese MNEs and medium-sized domestic firms are –1.3 percent and –1.0 percent 
respectively and those of small-sized Japanese MNEs and small-sized domestic firms 
are –1.1 percent and –1.3 percent respectively. Foreign-owned firms do not present 
much different job creation and destruction patterns among firm size. These results 
indicate that arguments of “hollowing out” of Japanese industries might be based on the 
difference of the employment patterns between large Japanese MNEs and large 
domestic firms. 
 
A2. Difference between 1995-1998 and 1998-2002 
As we confirmed in Table 1, the negative employment growth is particularly 
notable after 1998. Are there any differences of employment patterns between before 
and after 1998? To answer this question, we calculate the job creation and destruction 
rates for 1995-1998 and 1998-2002 separately. 
=== Table A4 === 
                                                        
18 For instance, if the employment of firm grows from 950 to 1200, it is included as the exit of 
medium-sized firm and the entry of large firm. 
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Table A4 presents the results. Regardless of firm types, job destruction rates for 
1998–2002 are much larger than those for 1995–1998. The job destruction rate of 
Japanese MNEs is –3.2 percent for 1995–1998 and –5.2 percent for 1998–2002. 
Similarly, the job destruction rates of foreign-owned firms and domestic firms for 1998–
2002 are –4.8 percent and –7.2 percent, respectively, which are much larger than those 
for 1995–1998 (–3.6 percent for foreign-owned firms and –4.6 percent for domestic 
firms). This result implies that the severe recession between 1998 and 2002 strongly 
affects the employment of firms in Japan, regardless of the firm type. 
 
A3. Difference across Industries 
Table 5 indicates that the job creation and destruction rates are different between 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing. If the job creation and destruction rates indicate 
large differences across the industries, we also should take into account the industry-
specific factors. Table A 5 examined the job creation and destruction rates, by industry 
in manufacturing. Total of net job flows in Table A5 corresponds to the sectoral 
employment growth in Table 2. 
=== Table A5 === 
The results suggest that the industry-specific factor might play an important role 
in the employment patterns of firms because the job creation and destruction rates 
slightly different across sectors even in the same status. For instance, foreign-owned 
firms indicate 1.9 percent of job creation rate in electrical machinery while 7.8 percent 
in precision machinery. Note, however, that even after we examined the same industry, 
the multinational status can explain some of the difference of employment across firms. 
In electrical machinery, the job destruction rate of Japanese MNEs is –4.6 percent that is 
significantly higher than that of domestic firms (–6.5 percent). This result suggests that 
multinational status is an important factor in explaining the employment patterns of 
firms in Japan, even after controlling for industry-specific factor. 
 
A4. Difference between production and nonproduction workers 
Table A6 presents the results of job creation and destruction rates for production 
workers and nonproduction workers from 1995 to 2002. Note that this table is slightly 
different from Tables 3 and 4. Since the decomposition is at the firm level, the sum of 
the rows and the sum of the columns become equivalent totals. 
=== Table A6 === 
Two messages are drawn from this table. First, net job destruction in production 
workers is confirmed in all types of firms, with Japanese MNEs presenting higher job 
net destruction rate than domestic firms. Net growth in employment of production 
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workers is –2.8 percent for MNEs, –0.4 percent for foreign-owned firms, and –1.6 
percent for domestic firms. The result clearly indicates that MNEs destroy production 
workers’ jobs vis-à-vis foreign-owned firms and domestic firms. It is also notable that 
foreign-owned firms create jobs for nonproduction workers as the net job creation rate 
is positive (0.1 percent). 
Second, the job destruction rate for MNEs’ production workers is much smaller 
than that for domestic firms, as the job destruction rate of domestic firms is –3.7 percent 
whereas that of MNEs is –3.0 percent. Combined with the first finding, we can see that 
the higher job destruction rate by Japanese MNEs is because MNEs do not create many 
jobs for production workers. The job creation rate of MNEs is only 0.3 percent. 
Domestic firms not only destroy jobs but also create jobs for production workers at the 
same time. Therefore, the net employment growth of production workers becomes 
smaller for MNEs than for domestic firms. 
 
20Figure 1.  Unemployment Rate in Japan, 1955-2005
Note: Unemployment is seasonally adjusted.









































































































21Table 1.  Employment of Japanese Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), Foreign-owned Firms, and Domestic Firms, 1995-2002
All firms Japanese MNEs Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms
Employment Growth (%) Employment Growth (%) Employment Growth (%) Employment Growth (%)
1995 7,782 3,073 161 4,548
1996 7,744 -0.5 3,045 -0.9 148 -8.5 4,552 0.1
1997 7,936 2.4 2,959 -2.9 181 20.2 4,796 5.2
1998 7,860 -1.0 2,872 -3.0 273 40.5 4,715 -1.7
1999 7,690 -2.2 2,712 -5.7 315 14.4 4,662 -1.1
2000 7,603 -1.1 2,705 -0.3 295 -6.6 4,603 -1.3
2001 7,337 -3.6 2,452 -9.8 303 2.5 4,582 -0.5
2002 7,086 -3.5 2,365 -3.6 320 5.5 4,402 -4.0
Notes: Japanese MNE: A firm that has more than one production affiliate in foreign countries.
Foreign-owned firm: A firm where more than 33.3 percent of the equity is owned by foreign investors and
that has more than one production plant in Japan.
Domestic firm: A firm other than Japanese MNE or foreign-owned firm.
The employment growth includes the employment changes through status change.
Source: METI database.
22Table 2.  Employment of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), Foreign-owned Firms, and Domestic Firms, by Industry
All firms Japanese MNEs
Level (thousands) Annual average growth
rate (%)
Level (thousands) Annual average growth
rate (%)












All industries 7,782 7,860 7,086 0.3 -2.6 -1.3 3,073 2,872 2,365 -2.3 -4.8 -3.7
Manufacturing 4,966 4,728 3,999 -1.6 -4.2 -3.1 2,651 2,466 2,055 -2.4 -4.5 -3.6
Food products and beverages 483 494 437 0.8 -3.1 -1.4 150 141 128 -2.1 -2.5 -2.3
Chemicals 439 409 367 -2.4 -2.7 -2.6 261 247 205 -1.8 -4.7 -3.4
Non-metallic mineral products 168 151 118 -3.5 -6.1 -5.0 88 80 66 -3.4 -4.8 -4.2
Iron, steel, and metal products 510 465 378 -3.1 -5.2 -4.2 267 251 200 -2.0 -5.7 -4.1
General machinery 504 477 412 -1.8 -3.6 -2.9 274 260 252 -1.8 -0.8 -1.2
Electrical machinery 1,158 1,103 900 -1.6 -5.1 -3.6 743 677 538 -3.1 -5.7 -4.6
Transportation machinery 773 743 646 -1.3 -3.5 -2.6 513 472 393 -2.7 -4.6 -3.8
Precision machinery 100 108 94 2.5 -3.5 -0.9 52 57 49 3.3 -3.8 -0.8
Other manufacturing 830 776 646 -2.3 -4.5 -3.6 303 280 225 -2.6 -5.5 -4.2
Wholesale/retail trade 2,816 3,132 3,087 3.5 -0.4 1.3 422 406 310 -1.3 -6.7 -4.4
Wholesale trade 1,255 1,196 1,079 -1.6 -2.6 -2.2 304 293 266 -1.2 -2.4 -1.9
Retail trade 1,561 1,936 2,009 7.1 0.9 3.6 118 114 44 -1.3 -22.2 -13.1
Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms
Level (thousands) Annual average growth
rate (%)
Level (thousands) Annual average growth
rate (%)












All industries 161 273 320 17.2 4.0 9.4 4,548 4,715 4,402 1.2 -1.7 -0.5
Manufacturing 126 223 251 18.6 2.9 9.5 2,189 2,039 1,693 -2.4 -4.6 -3.6
Food products and beverages 2 2 2 -3.9 1.9 -0.6 331 352 308 2.0 -3.3 -1.0
Chemicals 34 38 58 3.7 10.2 7.3 144 124 104 -5.0 -4.4 -4.6
Non-metallic mineral products 1 1 1 19.5 -12.0 1.6 79 70 52 -4.0 -7.5 -6.0
Iron, steel, and metal products 5 1 2 -43.1 19.1 -10.0 238 213 176 -3.7 -4.7 -4.3
General machinery 23 22 7 -1.7 -25.4 -15.0 207 196 154 -1.8 -6.0 -4.2
Electrical machinery 32 65 68 23.1 1.0 10.4 384 362 294 -2.0 -5.2 -3.8
Transportation machinery 18 82 107 42.3 6.4 20.2 241 189 147 -8.2 -6.2 -7.0
Precision machinery 1 1 1 11.7 3.7 7.0 48 50 43 1.3 -3.3 -1.3
Other manufacturing 10 10 4 0.8 -18.8 -10.4 518 485 417 -2.2 -3.8 -3.1
Wholesale/retail trade 35 50 69 11.6 7.9 9.2 2,359 2,676 2,708 4.2 0.3 2.0
Wholesale trade 31 32 43 0.6 7.3 4.4 920 872 770 -1.8 -3.1 -2.5
Retail trade 4 18 26 42.7 8.9 21.0 1,439 1,804 1,939 7.5 1.8 4.2
Note: See Table 1.
Source: METI database.
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[A] Entry 2.1% 0.4% 2.3% 3.1% 2.1% 0.4% 3.6% 3.0%
[B] Incumbent 1.4% 0.4% 0.7% 1.8% 1.4% 0.4% 1.1% 1.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 3.4% 0.8% 2.9% 4.8% 3.4% 0.8% 4.8% 4.9%
[D] Status change 1.5% 12.0% 0.6% 1.5% 3.8% 0.6%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 3.4% 2.3% 14.9% 5.4% 3.4% 2.3% 8.6% 5.5%
Job destruction
[A] Exit -2.7% -1.3% -1.9% -3.5% -2.7% -1.3% -3.1% -3.5%
[B] Incumbent -2.1% -2.6% -0.9% -1.4% -2.1% -2.8% -1.5% -1.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.7% -4.0% -2.8% -4.9% -4.7% -4.1% -4.5% -4.9%
[D] Status change -2.1% -2.7% -1.0% -1.2% -2.2% -1.0%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -4.7% -6.0% -5.5% -5.9% -4.7% -5.3% -6.7% -5.9%
Net job flows
[A] Entry and exit -0.6% -0.9% 0.3% -0.4% -0.6% -0.9% 0.6% -0.4%
[B] Incumbent -0.7% -2.2% -0.2% 0.4% -0.7% -2.4% -0.3% 0.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -1.3% -3.2% 0.2% 0.0% -1.3% -3.3% 0.2% 0.0%
[D] Status change -0.6% 9.3% -0.4% 0.3% 1.6% -0.4%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -1.3% -3.7% 9.4% -0.5% -1.3% -3.0% 1.9% -0.4%
Gross job flows
[A] Entry and exit 4.7% 1.8% 4.2% 6.5% 4.7% 1.7% 6.7% 6.5%
[B] Incumbent 3.4% 3.0% 1.6% 3.2% 3.4% 3.2% 2.6% 3.2%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 8.2% 4.8% 5.7% 9.7% 8.2% 4.9% 9.3% 9.7%
[D] Status change 3.6% 14.7% 1.6% 2.7% 6.1% 1.6%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 8.2% 8.3% 20.4% 11.4% 8.2% 7.6% 15.3% 11.3%
Source: METI database.
24Table 4.  Job Creation and Job Destruction: Difference between Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing Firms




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Entry 1.2% 3.4% 2.1% 0.3% 1.2% 0.4%
[B] Incumbent 0.6% 2.4% 1.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 1.8% 5.8% 3.4% 0.6% 1.8% 0.8%
[D] Status change 1.4% 2.0% 1.5%




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Exit -2.3% -3.1% -2.7% -1.3% -1.5% -1.3%
[B] Incumbent -2.6% -1.4% -2.1% -2.7% -2.1% -2.6%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.9% -4.5% -4.7% -4.0% -3.7% -4.0%
[D] Status change -1.7% -4.5% -2.1%




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Entry and exit -1.1% 0.2% -0.6% -1.0% -0.3% -0.9%
[B] Incumbent -1.9% 1.1% -0.7% -2.3% -1.5% -2.2%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -3.1% 1.3% -1.3% -3.4% -1.9% -3.2%
[D] Status change -0.3% -2.5% -0.6%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -3.1% 1.3% -1.3% -3.6% -4.4% -3.7%




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Entry 1.2% 5.9% 2.3% 2.3% 3.6% 3.1%
[B] Incumbent 0.6% 1.2% 0.7% 0.8% 2.6% 1.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 1.8% 7.0% 2.9% 3.0% 6.2% 4.8%
[D] Status change 13.0% 8.2% 12.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Exit -1.3% -4.0% -1.9% -3.7% -3.4% -3.5%
[B] Incumbent -0.8% -1.2% -0.9% -1.8% -1.1% -1.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -2.1% -5.2% -2.8% -5.4% -4.5% -4.9%
[D] Status change -3.2% -0.8% -2.7% -1.9% -0.4% -1.0%




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Entry and exit -0.1% 1.9% 0.3% -1.4% 0.3% -0.4%
[B] Incumbent -0.2% -0.1% -0.2% -1.0% 1.5% 0.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -0.3% 1.8% 0.2% -2.4% 1.8% 0.0%
[D] Status change 9.8% 7.4% 9.3% -1.3% 0.2% -0.4%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 9.5% 9.2% 9.4% -3.6% 2.0% -0.5%
Notes: 1) See Table 1 for the definition of Japanese MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms.
2) Figures indicate the annual average rate for 1995-2002.
Source: METI database.
25Table 5.  Difference of Firm-level Net Employment Growth among Japanese MNEs, Foreign-owned Firms, and Domestic Firms
Foreign-owned firm (more than 33.3 percent ownership)
All industries





Wholesale trade Retail trade
Foreign-owned firm dummy -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 0.010 0.002 -0.026
[-1.57] [-0.43] [-0.19] [-0.72] [0.96] [0.44] [-2.37]**
Japanese MNE dummy -0.001 0.005 0.010 -0.002 0.008 -0.007 -0.019
[-0.74] [4.48]*** [1.96]* [-0.87] [2.54]** [-2.40]** [-2.49]**
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0125 0.0213 0.0061 0.0581 0.015 0.0143 0.0061
N 87691 50257 3854 7006 4375 21542 15892
Foreign-owned firm (more than 50.0 percent ownership)
All industries





Wholesale trade Retail trade
Foreign-owned firm dummy -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 0.000 0.003 -0.027
[-1.76]* [-0.73] [-0.35] [-0.65] [0.01] [0.56] [-2.38]**
Japanese MNE dummy -0.001 0.006 0.009 -0.002 0.008 -0.007 -0.019
[-0.78] [4.53]*** [1.80]* [-0.80] [2.56]** [-2.36]** [-2.55]**
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0125 0.0213 0.0061 0.0581 0.015 0.0143 0.0061
N 87863 50359 3875 7048 4412 21564 15940
Note: ***, **, and  * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Figures in brackets indicate z-ratios.
Source: METI database.
26Table 6.  Speed of Employment Adjustment
Manufacturing Wholesale and retail trade
Chemicals Electrical machinery Transportation
machinery
Wholesal trade Retail trade
l it-1 0.415 0.421 0.697 0.703 0.447 0.445 0.371 0.358 0.616 0.660 0.617 0.726
[24.16]*** [25.03]*** [8.55]*** [8.69]*** [11.89]*** [11.67]*** [7.67]*** [7.22]*** [12.51]*** [16.38]*** [13.22]*** [24.13]***
D
JM * l it-1 0.174 0.185 0.035 0.039 0.190 0.198 0.355 0.372 0.240 0.218 0.253 0.136
[4.25]*** [4.58]*** [0.31] [0.38] [2.30]** [2.43]** [3.99]*** [4.23]*** [3.50]*** [3.40]*** [4.35]*** [2.85]***
D
FF * l it-1 0.392 0.386 0.210 0.184 0.402 0.405 0.510 0.521 0.290 0.246 0.369 0.241
[8.04]*** [8.09]*** [2.30]** [2.00]** [5.91]*** [5.93]*** [5.75]*** [6.24]*** [3.75]*** [3.25]*** [4.66]*** [3.38]***
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend No No No No No No No No No No No No
N 49,131 49,131 3,801 3,801 6,797 6,797 4,242 4,242 21,307 21,307 15,744 15,744
Hansen test 562.59 627.27 196.17 195.66 214.62 220.52 196.3 194.33 234.61 246.95 195.8 201.5
Hansen test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.938 0.941 0.418 0.312 0.460 0.500 0.368 0.185 0.718 0.614
AB test for AR(1) -28.940 -30.150 -6.110 -6.030 -11.900 -12.050 -10.580 -10.510 -9.360 -10.050 -6.960 -8.440
AB test for AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AB test for AR(2) 6.680 6.980 3.290 3.250 2.570 2.540 4.180 4.060 1.820 1.840 0.930 0.850
AB test for AR(2) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.066 0.354 0.397
Speed-of-adjustment
   Japanese MNEs 0.411 0.394 0.268 0.258 0.363 0.357 0.273 0.270 0.145 0.122 0.129 0.137
   Foreign-owned firms 0.193 0.194 0.092 0.113 0.151 0.150 0.119 0.121 0.095 0.095 0.013 0.033
   Domestic firms 0.585 0.579 0.303 0.297 0.553 0.555 0.629 0.642 0.384 0.340 0.383 0.274
Notes: 1) ***, **, and  * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Figures in brackets indicate z-ratios.
2) Foreign-owned firms are defined as firms whose more than 33.3 percent of equity is owned by foreign investors.
3) Other coefficients are reported in Table B2.
Source: METI database.
27Table A1.  Number of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), Foreign-owned Firms, and Domestic Firms, by Industry
Number of firms All firms Japanese MNEs Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms
1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002
All industries 19,130 18,968 16,945 1,811 1,986 1,987 202 312 338 17,117 16,670 14,620
Manufacturing 10,954 10,763 9,666 1,479 1,638 1,655 112 171 185 9,363 8,954 7,826
Food products and beverages 1,209 1,231 1,155 94 101 89 8 10 11 1,107 1,120 1,055
Chemicals 770 758 715 151 163 172 43 57 57 576 538 486
Non-metallic mineral products 539 507 389 49 53 47 3 4 3 487 450 339
Iron, steel, and metal products 1,459 1,412 1,264 169 198 198 5 9 11 1,285 1,205 1,055
General machinery 1,214 1,227 1,114 182 199 221 12 19 19 1,020 1,009 874
Electrical machinery 1,545 1,568 1,447 268 307 303 16 25 36 1,261 1,236 1,108
Transportation machinery 935 925 834 181 202 209 10 17 24 744 706 601
Precision machinery 281 294 294 59 63 65 4 6 8 218 225 221
Other manufacturing 3,002 2,841 2,454 326 352 351 11 24 16 2,665 2,465 2,087
Wholesale/retail trade 8,176 8,205 7,279 332 348 332 90 141 153 7,754 7,716 6,794
Wholesale trade 4,914 4,674 4,040 276 286 281 77 107 126 4,561 4,281 3,633
Retail trade 3,262 3,531 3,239 56 62 51 13 34 27 3,193 3,435 3,161
Share (%, all industries = 100.0) All firms Japanese MNEs Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms
1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002
All industries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Manufacturing 57.3 56.7 57.0 81.7 82.5 83.3 55.4 54.8 54.7 54.7 53.7 53.5
Food products and beverages 6.3 6.5 6.8 5.2 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.2 3.3 6.5 6.7 7.2
Chemicals 4.0 4.0 4.2 8.3 8.2 8.7 21.3 18.3 16.9 3.4 3.2 3.3
Non-metallic mineral products 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.4 1.5 1.3 0.9 2.8 2.7 2.3
Iron, steel, and metal products 7.6 7.4 7.5 9.3 10.0 10.0 2.5 2.9 3.3 7.5 7.2 7.2
General machinery 6.3 6.5 6.6 10.0 10.0 11.1 5.9 6.1 5.6 6.0 6.1 6.0
Electrical machinery 8.1 8.3 8.5 14.8 15.5 15.2 7.9 8.0 10.7 7.4 7.4 7.6
Transportation machinery 4.9 4.9 4.9 10.0 10.2 10.5 5.0 5.4 7.1 4.3 4.2 4.1
Precision machinery 1.5 1.5 1.7 3.3 3.2 3.3 2.0 1.9 2.4 1.3 1.3 1.5
Other manufacturing 15.7 15.0 14.5 18.0 17.7 17.7 5.4 7.7 4.7 15.6 14.8 14.3
Wholesale/retail trade 42.7 43.3 43.0 18.3 17.5 16.7 44.6 45.2 45.3 45.3 46.3 46.5
Wholesale trade 25.7 24.6 23.8 15.2 14.4 14.1 38.1 34.3 37.3 26.6 25.7 24.8
Retail trade 17.1 18.6 19.1 3.1 3.1 2.6 6.4 10.9 8.0 18.7 20.6 21.6
Note: See Table 1.
Source: METI database.
28Table A2.  Number of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), Foreign-owned Firms, and Domestic Firms, by Firm Size
All firms Japanese MNEs Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms
Number of firms 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002
All industries
1000- 1,178 1,241 1,119 546 524 437 30 36 48 602 681 634
300-999 3,392 3,434 3,052 578 659 632 53 72 73 2,761 2,703 2,347
50-299 14,560 14,293 12,774 687 803 918 119 204 217 13,754 13,286 11,639
Total 19,130 18,968 16,945 1,811 1,986 1,987 202 312 338 17,117 16,670 14,620
Manufacturing
1000- 740 725 584 468 452 371 23 30 37 249 243 176
300-999 1,946 1,914 1,703 476 541 527 27 34 33 1,443 1,339 1,143
50-299 8,268 8,124 7,379 535 645 757 62 107 115 7,671 7,372 6,507
Total 10,954 10,763 9,666 1,479 1,638 1,655 112 171 185 9,363 8,954 7,826
Wholesale/retail trade
1000- 438 516 535 78 72 66 7 6 11 353 438 458
300-999 1,446 1,520 1,349 102 118 105 26 38 40 1,318 1,364 1,204
50-299 6,292 6,169 5,395 152 158 161 57 97 102 6,083 5,914 5,132
Total 8,176 8,205 7,279 332 348 332 90 141 153 7,754 7,716 6,794
All firms Japanese MNEs Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms
Share (% of total) 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002
All industries
1000- 6.2 6.5 6.6 30.1 26.4 22.0 14.9 11.5 14.2 3.5 4.1 4.3
300-999 17.7 18.1 18.0 31.9 33.2 31.8 26.2 23.1 21.6 16.1 16.2 16.1
50-299 76.1 75.4 75.4 37.9 40.4 46.2 58.9 65.4 64.2 80.4 79.7 79.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Manufacturing
1000- 6.8 6.7 6.0 31.6 27.6 22.4 20.5 17.5 20.0 2.7 2.7 2.2
300-999 17.8 17.8 17.6 32.2 33.0 31.8 24.1 19.9 17.8 15.4 15.0 14.6
50-299 75.5 75.5 76.3 36.2 39.4 45.7 55.4 62.6 62.2 81.9 82.3 83.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Wholesale/retail trade
1000- 5.4 6.3 7.3 23.5 20.7 19.9 7.8 4.3 7.2 4.6 5.7 6.7
300-999 17.7 18.5 18.5 30.7 33.9 31.6 28.9 27.0 26.1 17.0 17.7 17.7
50-299 77.0 75.2 74.1 45.8 45.4 48.5 63.3 68.8 66.7 78.4 76.6 75.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
29Table A3.  Job Creation and Job Destruction, by Firm Size










[A] Entry 2.2% 5.0% 4.5% 0.4% 4.9% 5.2%
[B] Incumbent 1.3% 0.6% 0.7% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 3.5% 5.6% 5.2% 0.8% 5.2% 5.6%
[D] Status change 0.8% 2.7% 5.3%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 3.5% 5.6% 5.2% 1.6% 7.9% 10.9%
Job destruction
[A] Exit -2.3% -6.0% -5.6% -1.9% -4.0% -4.2%
[B] Incumbent -2.1% -1.2% -1.4% -2.6% -1.3% -1.1%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.5% -7.2% -7.0% -4.4% -5.3% -5.3%
[D] Status change -2.0% -1.5% -1.7%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -1.0% -1.6% -1.8% -4.9% 1.1% 3.9%
Net job flows
[A] Entry and exit -0.1% -1.0% -1.1% -1.5% 1.0% 1.0%
[B] Incumbent -0.9% -0.6% -0.7% -2.2% -1.0% -0.7%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -1.0% -1.6% -1.8% -3.7% -0.1% 0.3%
[D] Status change -1.2% 1.2% 3.6%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 2.5% 4.0% 3.3% -3.3% 9.0% 14.9%










[A] Entry 1.9% 7.8% 8.1% 4.8% 5.0% 4.4%
[B] Incumbent 0.4% 0.3% 0.6% 2.4% 0.6% 0.6%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 2.3% 8.0% 8.7% 7.2% 5.6% 5.0%
[D] Status change 13.6% 5.2% 4.3% 1.2% 0.3% 0.1%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 15.9% 13.2% 13.0% 8.4% 5.9% 5.2%
Job destruction
[A] Exit -1.4% -7.3% -4.8% -3.1% -6.5% -5.7%
[B] Incumbent -0.8% -0.7% -1.1% -0.8% -1.0% -1.3%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -2.2% -8.1% -5.9% -3.9% -7.5% -7.1%
[D] Status change -3.1% -0.4% -0.6% -1.3% -0.8% -0.5%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 10.6% 4.7% 6.5% 3.1% -2.5% -2.4%
Net job flows
[A] Entry and exit 0.5% 0.4% 3.3% 1.7% -1.6% -1.3%
[B] Incumbent -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% 1.6% -0.4% -0.7%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 0.1% 0.0% 2.8% 3.3% -2.0% -2.0%
[D] Status change 10.5% 4.8% 3.7% -0.2% -0.5% -0.4%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 26.5% 18.0% 19.5% 11.5% 3.4% 2.8%
Note: See Table 1 for the definition of Japanese MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms.
Source: METI database.
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Table A4.  Job Creation and Job Destruction: Difference between 1995-1998 and 1998-2002


















[A] Entry 2.6% 2.0% 0.4% 0.4% 1.5% 2.4% 4.1% 3.0%
[B] Incumbent 2.0% 2.0% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 1.3% 2.6% 2.5%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 4.6% 4.1% 1.1% 1.2% 2.3% 3.7% 6.7% 5.4%
[D] Status change 2.7% 2.1% 20.3% 8.8% 1.3% 1.2%


















[A] Exit -1.9% -3.7% -0.8% -1.7% -1.5% -2.4% -2.6% -5.0%
[B] Incumbent -2.4% -2.9% -2.4% -3.5% -2.1% -2.4% -2.0% -2.1%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.3% -6.7% -3.2% -5.2% -3.6% -4.8% -4.6% -7.2%
[D] Status change -2.8% -2.9% -1.7% -3.8% -2.2% -1.2%


















[A] Entry and exit 0.7% -1.7% -0.4% -1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% -2.1%
[B] Incumbent -0.4% -0.9% -1.8% -2.8% -1.3% -1.0% 0.6% 0.3%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 0.3% -2.6% -2.2% -4.1% -1.3% -1.0% 2.1% -1.7%
[D] Status change -0.1% -0.8% 18.5% 5.0% -0.9% 0.0%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 0.3% -2.6% -2.3% -4.8% 17.2% 4.0% 1.2% -1.7%
Source: METI database.
31Table A5.  Job Creation and Job Destruction: Difference across Industries


















[A] Entry 0.7% 1.0% 1.3% 0.6% 1.9% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 1.0%
[B] Incumbent 1.1% 0.6% 0.4% 0.6% 1.1% 0.7% 0.6% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 1.7% 1.6% 1.7% 1.2% 3.0% 0.9% 1.0% 0.5% 0.6% 1.4%
[D] Status change 1.4% 2.2% 0.7% 1.6% 1.3%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 1.7% 1.6% 1.7% 1.2% 3.0% 2.3% 3.1% 1.2% 2.2% 2.7%
Job destruction
[A] Exit -1.9% -2.3% -2.1% -1.7% -1.9% -1.2% -1.5% -0.9% -1.2% -0.5%
[B] Incumbent -2.4% -2.2% -3.2% -2.0% -1.9% -2.9% -2.1% -3.7% -1.0% -2.3%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.3% -4.5% -5.3% -3.7% -3.9% -4.1% -3.7% -4.6% -2.2% -2.7%
[D] Status change -1.7% -0.7% -1.1% -3.7% -0.8%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -4.3% -4.5% -5.3% -3.7% -3.9% -5.7% -4.4% -5.7% -5.9% -3.5%
Net job flows
[A] Entry and exit -1.2% -1.3% -0.8% -1.1% -0.1% -1.0% -1.1% -0.5% -1.1% 0.5%
[B] Incumbent -1.3% -1.6% -2.8% -1.5% -0.9% -2.2% -1.6% -3.6% -0.5% -1.9%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -2.6% -2.9% -3.6% -2.6% -0.9% -3.2% -2.7% -4.1% -1.6% -1.3%
[D] Status change -0.3% 1.5% -0.4% -2.2% 0.6%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -2.6% -2.9% -3.6% -2.6% -0.9% -3.4% -1.2% -4.6% -3.8% -0.8%


















[A] Entry 0.6% 1.3% 1.9% 0.8% 4.3% 1.5% 1.8% 2.9% 1.7% 2.8%
[B] Incumbent 1.9% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 3.5% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.6% 1.3%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 2.5% 1.4% 1.9% 0.9% 7.8% 2.2% 2.4% 3.7% 2.3% 4.1%
[D] Status change 9.2% 1.4% 10.2% 23.2% 0.0% 0.7% 0.8% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 11.7% 2.8% 12.2% 24.1% 7.8% 3.0% 3.2% 4.1% 2.8% 4.8%
Job destruction
[A] Exit -2.5% -0.2% -0.4% -0.2% 0.0% -3.0% -3.5% -4.5% -3.3% -3.7%
[B] Incumbent -1.2% -1.0% -0.9% 0.0% -0.7% -1.0% -1.9% -1.9% -1.6% -1.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -3.7% -1.2% -1.4% -0.2% -0.7% -4.0% -5.5% -6.5% -4.9% -5.0%
[D] Status change -0.7% -16.7% -0.4% -3.8% 0.0% -3.6% -2.0% -1.5% -4.9% -1.1%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -4.4% -17.9% -1.8% -4.0% -0.7% -7.6% -7.4% -7.9% -9.8% -6.2%
Net job flows
[A] Entry and exit -1.9% 1.1% 1.4% 0.6% 4.3% -1.5% -1.7% -1.6% -1.5% -0.9%
[B] Incumbent 0.8% -0.9% -0.9% 0.1% 2.7% -0.3% -1.4% -1.2% -1.0% 0.0%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -1.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 7.0% -1.8% -3.0% -2.7% -2.6% -0.9%
[D] Status change 8.5% -15.2% 9.9% 19.5% 0.0% -2.9% -1.2% -1.0% -4.4% -0.4%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 7.3% -15.0% 10.4% 20.2% 7.0% -4.6% -4.2% -3.8% -7.0% -1.3%
For notes and source, see Table 4.
32Table A6.  Job Creation and Job Destruction: Difference between Production and Non-production Workers
All firms Japanese MNEs











[A] Entry 0.8% 0.4% 1.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3%
[B] Incumbent 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 1.1% 0.7% 1.8% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6%
[D] Status change 0.8% 0.6% 1.4%











[A] Exit -1.5% -0.8% -2.3% -0.8% -0.5% -1.3%
[B] Incumbent -2.0% -0.6% -2.6% -2.2% -0.5% -2.7%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -3.5% -1.4% -4.9% -3.0% -1.0% -4.0%
[D] Status change -1.0% -0.7% -1.7%











[A] Entry and exit -0.7% -0.5% -1.1% -0.6% -0.4% -1.0%
[B] Incumbent -1.7% -0.2% -1.9% -2.1% -0.2% -2.3%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -2.4% -0.7% -3.1% -2.8% -0.6% -3.4%
[D] Status change -0.2% 0.0% -0.3%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -2.4% -0.7% -3.1% -3.0% -0.6% -3.6%
Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms











[A] Entry 0.8% 0.5% 1.2% 1.6% 0.7% 2.3%
[B] Incumbent 0.1% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.2% 0.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 0.9% 0.9% 1.8% 2.1% 0.9% 3.0%
[D] Status change 6.8% 6.2% 13.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.6%











[A] Exit -0.6% -0.8% -1.3% -2.5% -1.2% -3.7%
[B] Incumbent -0.7% 0.0% -0.8% -1.2% -0.5% -1.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -1.3% -0.8% -2.1% -3.7% -1.7% -5.4%
[D] Status change -1.7% -1.5% -3.2% -1.1% -0.8% -1.9%











[A] Entry and exit 0.2% -0.3% -0.1% -0.9% -0.5% -1.4%
[B] Incumbent -0.7% 0.4% -0.2% -0.7% -0.3% -1.0%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -0.4% 0.1% -0.3% -1.6% -0.8% -2.4%
[D] Status change 5.1% 4.7% 9.8% -0.8% -0.4% -1.3%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 4.7% 4.8% 9.5% -2.4% -1.2% -3.6%
For notes and source, see Table 4.
33Table B1.  Summary Statistics of Variables
Summary statistics
l it D
JM * l it-1 D
FF * l it-1 y it w/r it D
JM * y it D
FF * y it D
JM * w/r it D
FF * w/r it
N 50,028 50,028 50,028 50,028 50,028 50,028 50,028 50,028 50,028
mean 5.220 0.778 0.061 2.514 3.452 0.486 0.039 0.436 0.040
variance 0.973 2.147 0.603 1.220 0.334 1.417 0.407 1.184 0.393
Correlation matrix
l it D
JM * l it-1 D
FF * l it-1 y it w/r it D
JM * y it D
FF * y it D
JM * w/r it D
FF * w/r it
Number of workers l it 1
Japanese MNE dummy * Number of workers (t-1) D
JM * l it-1 0.552 1
Foreign-ownership dummy * Number of workers (t-1) D
FF * l it-1 0.085 -0.037 1
Real output (value-added) y it 0.921 0.537 0.124 1
Wage-rental ratio w/r it 0.237 0.212 0.121 0.495 1
Japanese MNE dummy * Number of workers (t-1) D
JM * y it 0.598 0.981 -0.035 0.591 0.244 1.000
Foreign-ownership dummy * Number of workers (t-1) D
FF * y it 0.098 -0.035 0.984 0.138 0.126 -0.033 1.000
Japanese MNE dummy * Real output (value-added) D
JM * w/r it 0.485 0.983 -0.037 0.482 0.216 0.943 -0.036 1.000
Foreign-ownership dummy * Real output (value-added) D
FF * w/r it 0.061 -0.037 0.978 0.107 0.127 -0.035 0.945 -0.038 1.000
Note: For the definition of variables, see main text.
34Table B2.  Speed of Employment Adjustment
Manufacturing Wholesale and retail trade
Chemicals Electrical machinery Transportation
machinery
Wholesal trade Retail trade
Constant -0.463 0.063 2.748 0.005 -0.315 -0.050 0.247 -0.043 1.776 -0.003 2.220 0.000
[-1.35] [0.32] [3.50]*** [1.05] [-0.51] [-7.94]*** [0.22] [-5.65]*** [5.52]*** [-2.22]** [6.19]*** [0.05]
D
JM 0.388 0.329 -1.291 -0.685 -0.465 -0.496 -1.352 -1.568 -1.225 -0.972 -1.510 -0.603
[1.36] [1.22] [-1.61] [-1.01] [-0.73] [-0.80] [-1.68]* [-1.98]** [-2.75]*** [-2.30]** [-3.70]*** [-2.04]**
D
FF -0.516 -0.663 -2.759 -1.977 -0.708 -0.701 -0.486 -0.379 -1.613 -1.170 -2.014 -1.081
[-1.05] [-1.44] [-3.40]*** [-2.62]*** [-1.15] [-1.38] [-0.49] [-0.46] [-3.99]*** [-3.29]*** [-1.78]* [-0.97]
l it-1 0.415 0.421 0.697 0.703 0.447 0.445 0.371 0.358 0.616 0.660 0.617 0.726
[24.16]*** [25.03]*** [8.55]*** [8.69]*** [11.89]*** [11.67]*** [7.67]*** [7.22]*** [12.51]*** [16.38]*** [13.22]*** [24.13]***
D
JM * l it-1 0.174 0.185 0.035 0.039 0.190 0.198 0.355 0.372 0.240 0.218 0.253 0.136
[4.25]*** [4.58]*** [0.31] [0.38] [2.30]** [2.43]** [3.99]*** [4.23]*** [3.50]*** [3.40]*** [4.35]*** [2.85]***
D
FF * l it-1 0.392 0.386 0.210 0.184 0.402 0.405 0.510 0.521 0.290 0.246 0.369 0.241
[8.04]*** [8.09]*** [2.30]** [2.00]** [5.91]*** [5.93]*** [5.75]*** [6.24]*** [3.75]*** [3.25]*** [4.66]*** [3.38]***
y it 0.587 0.398 0.181 0.136 0.427 0.315 0.118 0.036 0.320 0.235 0.389 0.237
[10.74]*** [9.69]*** [1.36] [1.06] [4.28]*** [3.99]*** [0.95] [0.34] [5.61]*** [5.53]*** [6.82]*** [5.52]***
-0.277 -0.121 0.023 0.033 -0.104 -0.010 -0.024 0.026 -0.022 0.011 -0.046 0.018
[-6.20]*** [-3.71]*** [0.18] [0.26] [-1.28] [-0.16] [-0.24] [0.31] [-0.69] [0.42] [-1.11] [0.46]
D
JM * y it -0.088 -0.102 0.107 0.035 -0.165 -0.127 0.223 0.265 -0.147 -0.115 -0.243 -0.111
[-1.01] [-1.22] [0.68] [0.24] [-1.33] [-1.07] [1.42] [1.67]* [-2.00]** [-1.71]* [-3.38]*** [-1.82]*
0.038 0.051 -0.079 0.013 0.038 0.005 -0.085 -0.098 -0.054 -0.061 0.003 -0.043
[0.53] [0.77] [-0.43] [0.08] [0.35] [0.05] [-0.55] [-0.63] [-1.22] [-1.32] [0.05] [-0.92]
D
FF * y it -0.548 -0.401 0.096 0.035 -0.631 -0.538 0.156 0.225 -0.354 -0.296 -0.267 -0.124
[-5.16]*** [-4.11]*** [0.66] [0.23] [-3.61]*** [-3.37]*** [0.34] [0.50] [-3.62]*** [-3.43]*** [-2.89]*** [-1.44]
0.381 0.272 -0.173 -0.053 0.420 0.344 -0.105 -0.146 0.136 0.130 -0.024 -0.065
[3.18]*** [2.38]** [-1.12] [-0.33] [2.13]** [1.85]* [-0.23] [-0.33] [1.78]* [1.84]* [-0.26] [-0.70]
w/r it 0.481704 0.4645731 -1.192487 -0.112478 0.4645319 0.5289143 0.7379459 0.8446549 -0.576736 -0.037241 -0.740158 -0.05449
[1.94]* [11.21]*** [-3.44]*** [-0.92] [1.47] [4.35]*** [1.08] [5.40]*** [-3.36]*** [-1.48] [-4.97]*** [-1.84]*
-0.036 -0.077 0.653 -0.209 -0.087 -0.128 -0.303 -0.313 0.423 -0.016 0.458 -0.063
[-0.16] [-2.43]** [2.62]*** [-2.14]** [-0.29] [-1.39] [-0.51] [-2.55]** [2.69]*** [-0.82] [3.21]*** [-2.91]***
D
JM * w/r it -0.419 -0.381 0.115 -0.083 -0.315 -0.331 -0.507 -0.481 0.189 0.123 0.131 -0.097
[-5.69]*** [-5.60]*** [0.66] [-0.52] [-1.77]* [-1.89]* [-1.90]* [-1.83]* [2.23]** [1.50] [1.16] [-0.80]
0.219 0.196 0.209 0.226 0.414 0.427 0.447 0.441 -0.051 -0.040 0.066 0.147
[3.75]*** [3.49]*** [1.83]* [2.01]** [2.91]*** [3.04]*** [2.11]** [2.07]** [-0.83] [-0.62] [0.72] [1.47]
D
FF * w/r it -0.245 -0.251 0.267 0.009 0.242 0.193 -1.441 -1.507 0.301 0.120 0.049 -0.263
[-1.44] [-1.62] [1.09] [0.04] [0.60] [0.52] [-2.21]** [-2.43]** [2.77]*** [1.31] [0.29] [-1.80]*
0.083 0.112 0.295 0.328 -0.293 -0.265 1.071 1.073 -0.116 -0.034 0.153 0.318
[0.62] [0.86] [1.94]* [2.15]** [-0.86] [-0.83] [1.92]* [1.95]* [-1.42] [-0.48] [0.64] [1.33]
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend No No No No No No No No No No No No
N 49,131 49,131 3,801 3,801 6,797 6,797 4,242 4,242 21,307 21,307 15,744 15,744
Hansen test 562.59 627.27 196.17 195.66 214.62 220.52 196.3 194.33 234.61 246.95 195.8 201.5
Hansen test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.938 0.941 0.418 0.312 0.460 0.500 0.368 0.185 0.718 0.614
AB test for AR(1) -28.940 -30.150 -6.110 -6.030 -11.900 -12.050 -10.580 -10.510 -9.360 -10.050 -6.960 -8.440
AB test for AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AB test for AR(2) 6.680 6.980 3.290 3.250 2.570 2.540 4.180 4.060 1.820 1.840 0.930 0.850
AB test for AR(2) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.066 0.354 0.397
Speed-of-adjustment
   Japanese MNEs 0.411 0.394 0.268 0.258 0.363 0.357 0.273 0.270 0.145 0.122 0.129 0.137
   Foreign-owned firms 0.193 0.194 0.092 0.113 0.151 0.150 0.119 0.121 0.095 0.095 0.013 0.033
   Domestic firms 0.585 0.579 0.303 0.297 0.553 0.555 0.629 0.642 0.384 0.340 0.383 0.274
Notes: 1) ***, **, and  * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Figures in brackets indicate z-ratios.
2) Foreign-owned firms are defined as firms whose more than 33.3 percent of equity is owned by foreign investors.
Source: METI database.
35Table B3.  Speed of Employment Adjustment: Majority Foreign-owned Firms
Manufacturing Wholesale and retail trade
Chemicals Electrical machinery Transportation
machinery
Wholesal trade Retail trade
Constant -0.447 0.058 2.631 0.005 -0.277 -0.050 0.369 -0.044 1.782 -0.003 2.226 0.000
[-1.31] [0.29] [3.47]*** [1.04] [-0.45] [-7.93]*** [0.33] [-5.73]*** [5.52]*** [-2.22]** [6.20]*** [0.15]
D
JM 0.338 0.276 -1.220 -0.626 -0.439 -0.467 -1.362 -1.516 -1.223 -0.969 -1.373 -0.510
[1.20] [1.04] [-1.55] [-0.93] [-0.70] [-0.76] [-1.73]* [-1.95]* [-2.74]*** [-2.29]** [-3.06]*** [-1.51]
D
FF -0.704 -0.858 -2.753 -2.026 -0.676 -0.652 -1.368 -1.394 -1.595 -1.175 -2.013 -1.084
[-1.34] [-1.75]* [-3.55]*** [-2.91]*** [-1.01] [-1.15] [-0.71] [-0.72] [-4.10]*** [-3.43]*** [-1.78]* [-0.97]
l it-1 0.414 0.420 0.704 0.709 0.447 0.445 0.367 0.354 0.616 0.660 0.617 0.726
[24.12]*** [25.01]*** [8.77]*** [8.84]*** [11.92]*** [11.68]*** [7.62]*** [7.14]*** [12.51]*** [16.40]*** [13.22]*** [24.17]***
D
JM * l it-1 0.177 0.188 0.022 0.032 0.177 0.186 0.343 0.363 0.239 0.218 0.236 0.126
[4.38]*** [4.75]*** [0.20] [0.31] [2.13]** [2.26]** [3.94]*** [4.19]*** [3.50]*** [3.39]*** [3.91]*** [2.46]**
D
FF * l it-1 0.389 0.387 0.196 0.183 0.378 0.381 0.473 0.478 0.279 0.239 0.368 0.241
[7.60]*** [7.69]*** [2.15]** [1.98]** [5.40]*** [5.41]*** [6.92]*** [7.25]*** [3.65]*** [3.19]*** [4.65]*** [3.39]***
y it 0.590 0.401 0.175 0.135 0.427 0.314 0.118 0.047 0.320 0.235 0.389 0.237
[10.78]*** [9.77]*** [1.31] [1.05] [4.28]*** [3.99]*** [0.97] [0.45] [5.59]*** [5.50]*** [6.83]*** [5.53]***
-0.278 -0.122 0.028 0.035 -0.103 -0.009 -0.018 0.018 -0.023 0.011 -0.046 0.018
[-6.21]*** [-3.74]*** [0.22] [0.28] [-1.27] [-0.15] [-0.18] [0.22] [-0.70] [0.41] [-1.12] [0.47]
D
JM * y it -0.075 -0.086 0.122 0.033 -0.179 -0.142 0.289 0.325 -0.147 -0.115 -0.251 -0.119
[-0.84] [-1.02] [0.77] [0.22] [-1.46] [-1.21] [1.80]* [2.00]** [-1.99]** [-1.71]* [-3.68]*** [-2.04]**
0.028 0.040 -0.088 0.017 0.055 0.024 -0.134 -0.144 -0.053 -0.060 0.026 -0.025
[0.39] [0.59] [-0.48] [0.10] [0.52] [0.24] [-0.83] [-0.89] [-1.20] [-1.29] [0.45] [-0.50]
D
FF * y it -0.575 -0.426 0.222 0.197 -0.641 -0.549 -0.377 -0.309 -0.355 -0.297 -0.267 -0.124
[-5.23]*** [-4.15]*** [1.44] [1.23] [-3.56]*** [-3.31]*** [-1.59] [-1.39] [-3.66]*** [-3.48]*** [-2.90]*** [-1.44]
0.431 0.315 -0.282 -0.221 0.441 0.366 0.455 0.420 0.147 0.139 -0.022 -0.066
[3.51]*** [2.69]*** [-1.71]* [-1.29] [2.18]** [1.91]* [1.90]* [1.84]* [1.86]* [1.89]* [-0.24] [-0.71]
w/r it 0.4714634 0.4628736 -1.099327 -0.10456 0.4351681 0.5266644 0.5524451 0.8382949 -0.578993 -0.037494 -0.711394 -0.05416
[1.91]* [11.20]*** [-3.32]*** [-0.86] [1.38] [4.36]*** [0.81] [5.39]*** [-3.39]*** [-1.49] [-4.69]*** [-1.83]*
-0.031 -0.076 0.584 -0.203 -0.068 -0.132 -0.148 -0.299 0.423 -0.016 0.427 -0.064
[-0.14] [-2.38]** [2.49]** [-2.09]** [-0.23] [-1.44] [-0.25] [-2.44]** [2.72]*** [-0.84] [2.93]*** [-2.94]***
D
JM * w/r it -0.418 -0.381 0.128 -0.066 -0.318 -0.335 -0.533 -0.518 0.189 0.124 0.120 -0.092
[-5.69]*** [-5.65]*** [0.73] [-0.41] [-1.81]* [-1.94]* [-2.09]** [-2.07]** [2.24]** [1.51] [1.08] [-0.80]
0.225 0.203 0.186 0.198 0.426 0.439 0.473 0.461 -0.052 -0.042 0.052 0.124
[3.90]*** [3.66]*** [1.66]* [1.78]* [3.03]*** [3.15]*** [2.29]** [2.21]** [-0.86] [-0.66] [0.59] [1.27]
D
FF * w/r it -0.067 -0.074 0.313 0.077 0.262 0.196 -1.277 -1.363 0.292 0.110 0.039 -0.264
[-0.39] [-0.48] [1.38] [0.39] [0.63] [0.51] [-1.32] [-1.38] [2.70]*** [1.20] [0.23] [-1.80]*
-0.068 -0.035 0.241 0.272 -0.293 -0.253 1.176 1.234 -0.106 -0.019 0.165 0.318
[-0.51] [-0.27] [1.61] [1.76]* [-0.81] [-0.75] [2.06]** [2.22]** [-1.16] [-0.24] [0.69] [1.34]
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend No No No No No No No No No No No No
N 49,230 49,230 3,822 3,822 6,839 6,839 4,276 4,276 21,329 21,329 15,792 15,792
Hansen test 565.24 629.14 186.9 195.66 214.25 220.03 201.29 193.68 236.2 244.04 200.04 199.75
Hansen test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.978 0.941 0.368 0.270 0.196 0.316 0.341 0.222 0.642 0.647
AB test for AR(1) -28.990 -30.190 -6.130 -6.090 -11.900 -12.040 -10.670 -10.570 -9.350 -10.050 -7.010 -8.470
AB test for AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AB test for AR(2) 6.650 6.970 3.340 3.290 2.530 2.510 4.240 4.090 1.820 1.840 0.900 0.800
AB test for AR(2) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.066 0.370 0.424
Speed-of-adjustment
   Japanese MNEs 0.409 0.392 0.275 0.259 0.376 0.369 0.289 0.283 0.145 0.122 0.147 0.149
   Foreign-owned firms 0.196 0.193 0.100 0.109 0.175 0.174 0.160 0.167 0.105 0.101 0.015 0.033
   Domestic firms 0.586 0.580 0.296 0.291 0.553 0.555 0.633 0.646 0.384 0.340 0.383 0.274
Notes: 1) ***, **, and  * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Figures in brackets indicate z-ratios.
2) Foreign-owned firms are defined as firms whose more than 50 percent of equity is owned by foreign investors.
Source: METI database.
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